



RIGHT OF REAL ESTATE AND LOAN BROKERS TO
COMIIISSIONS.
Preliminary.-" In principle the case of a broker negotiating a
loan is the same as that of a broker negotiating a sale of property,"
and in this article both subjects will be treated together: Vrinton
v. Baldwin, 88 Ind. 104; B'udd v. Zoller, 52 Mo. 238.
The Usual Contract.-The right of a broker to commission,
earned in the sale of real estate or the procuring of a loan, depends
upon contract with his employer. The broker may make almost
any kind of a contract with his employer, upon which his right to
a commission may depend; it may therefore rest on many contin-
gencies: Hinds v. Henry, 36 N. J. L. 328. The usual contract,
however, between the broker and his employer desiring to sell, is
that the former will procure a purchaser for him. Sometimes con-
ditions are annexed-as that the sale should be made, or the pur-
chaser should be a person acceptable to the vendor. If the contract
be to furnish a purchaser, the broker's commissions are earned when
a purchaser able and willing to buy on the terms proposed, is found
by the broker and introduced to the vendor: Vinton v. Baldwin,
88 Ind. 104; Gillett v. Corum, 7 Kan. 156; DeLaplaine v. Turn-
ley, 44 Wis. 31; 2eGavock v. Woodlief, 20 How. 221; Hague
v. O'Conner, 1 Sweeny 472; S. C. 41 How. Pr. 287; Smith v.
Smith, 1 Sweeny 552; .eynolds v. Tompkins, 23 W. Va. 229;
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Coleman v. Meade, 13 Bush 358; Pearson v. Mason, 120 Mass.
53; Leete v. Norton, 43 Conn. 219 ; Hoyt v. Shipherd, 70 Ill.
309; Ward v. Lawrence, 79 Id. 295; Dennis v. Charlick, 13
N. Y. Sup. Ct. 21 ; Pratt v. Hotchkiss, 10 Ill. App. 603; Fin-
nerty v. Fritz, 5 Col. 174; Green v. Robertson, 64 Cal. 75; Cas-
ady v. Seely, 29 N. W. Rep. 432; .amlin v. Schulte, 27 Id. 301;
Jones v. Adler, 34 Md. 440; Glentworth v. Luther, 21 Barb.
145; Doty v. Miller, 43 Id. 529; Middletown v. Findla, 25 Cal.
76 ; Chilton v. Butler, 1 E. D. Smith 150 ; Morgan v. Mason, 4
Id. 636; Clap v. Hughes, 1 Phila. 382; Barnard v. Monnot,
34 Barb. 90. The customer produced by the broker must not only
be ready and willing to comply with the terms of the contract, but
he must have the present ability to consummate it or to comply with
all its terms. If the sale be for cash, he must have the cash or be
able to procure it; if upon credit, he must be a person who is not
only able to enter into the contract, but also one who is responsible
for his contracts and against whom it could be enforced: Pratt v.
Patterson, 8 At. Rep. 858 ; Duclos v. Cunningham, 6 N. E. Rep.
790; Coleman v. Meade, 13 Bush 358; Cook v. Kroemekce, 4
Daly 268; Kimberly v. Henderson, 29 Md. 512. In a suit to
recover commissions it is not necessary to aver that the purchaser
was solvent or able to buy. Solvency is presumed; and, if insol-
vency be relied upon, it must be plead and proven as a defence:
Hart v. Hoffman, 44 How. Pr. 168 ; Cook v. Kroemekce, 4 Daly
268; contra, Coleman v. Meade, 13 Bush 358; but the plaintiff
must show that the purchaser was willing to accept the contract in
its exact terms: Coleman v. Meade, 13 Bush 858. It is not
necessary for the broker to tender the contract of the purchaser
in writing; a willingness on his part to buy is sufficient in this
respect: Cook v. Kroemeke, 4 Daly 268. It is no defence on the
part of the owner of the land that the title to his land is defective,
and for that reason the person produced by the purchaser would
not buy: Gonzales v. Broad, 57 Cal. 224; Doty v. Miller, 43
Barb. 529; Topping v. Realey, 3 F. & F. 325. And where the
employment is to purchase a certain named tract of real estate, if
the broker brings the owner and his employer together, it is no
defence for refusing to take it on account of its defective title. The
employer should have-contracted against such a contingency with
his broker before he had procured the owner to sell it: Knapp v.
Wallace, 41 N. Y. 477.
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Procuring Cause.-To entitle the broker to commissions he must
have been the procuring cause of the sale or purchase: . kclave
v. Paine, 49 N. Y. 561; s. c. 41 How. Pr. 140 ; Lloyd v.
Mathews, 51 N. Y. 124; Lincoln v. McClat ie, 36 Conn. 186;
White v. Twitchings, 26 Hun 503; Eary v. Cummins, 54 Penn.
St. 394; Wylie v. Marine RNat. Bank, 61 N. Y. 415; Bayley v.
(hadwick, 89 L. T. N. S. 429 ; s. c. 86 Id. 740.
Thus a defendant left with the plaintiff a lot to sell at private
sale for $6500, the latter to receive one per cent. as commission.
The defendant was to have the right to sell it himself, and in that
case the broker was not to have any commission. The plaintiff
entered the lot in his description book, kept in his office for the
consultation of his customers. Afterwards the plaintiff reduced
the price upon the description book to $6000, supposing he had the
defendant's consent so to do, but which in fact he did not have.
Then the plaintiff advertised certain other houses for sale. One
Goodwin residing in the neighborhood of those houses, was looking
for a house for his friend Burdick. He also took an interest in
the real estate matters in his neighborhood, and was attracted by the
advertisement to the plaintiff's office, where he learned from the
plaintiff that the defendant's house was for sale. The plaintiff
gave him the price as $6000. Goodwin subsequently informed
Burdick that the house could be purchased for $6000; and the
latter asked him to look at it and report to him, which he did,
advising him to buy. Burdick then examined the house himself,
and soon after entered into negotiations with the defendant person-
ally, which resulted in the latter selling to him the place (with a
few articles of personal property worth less than $100), for $6500,
about one month after Goodwin saw the advertisement referred to.
Burdick bad no personal intercourse with the plaintiff. Goodwin's
connection with the plaintiff in the matter was voluntary. He
informed Burdick before he purchased that the house was in the
plaintiff's hands for sale at $6000. Under the facts it was held that
the plaintiff was entitled to recover of the defendant his commis-
sions, because he was the procuring cause of the sale. "Had
Burdick in the first instance requested Goodwin to do what was
done by.him in this transaction, the case would have stood precisely
as if Burdick had procured the information himself from the plain-
tiff, on the principle quifacitper alium facit per se, and the defend-
ant in that case would clearly have been liable. Is the case
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materially different ? Goodwin acted for Burdick in procuring the
information. He did not casually obtain it, but went to the office
of the plaintiff to ascertain what intelligence he had to disclose.
Burdick acted upon the information when communicated to him by
Goodwin, knowing from what source it had been obtained. He
adopted the acts of Goodwin, which was equivalent to a previous
request to perform the acts. The plaintiff was pursuing the busi-
ness of a broker in giving the information, and Goodwin received
it for Burdick in the capacity of a messenger and conveyed it to
him. Suppose Goodwin had informed the plaintiff for what pur-
pose he inquired, and the information had been given for the pur-
pose of being communicated to Burdick, would the case for the
plaintiff have been stronger? The information was given in order
to procure a purchaser, and can the fact that Goodwin did not
make known for whom he was acting make any material difference,
when his act operated directly to bring the buyer and seller together?
They show that the plaintiff was the procuring cause of the sale,
as much as would have been the case if Goodwin had made known
his business, or Burdick had gone in person to the office of the
plaintiff and obtained the information himself. The defendant
further claims that he specially reserved the right to sell the pro-
perty without being liable to pay a commission to the plaintiff. We
think the proper construction of the understanding was, that the
defendant should have the right to sell to a purchaser found by him
independently of the plaintiff's procurement :" Lincoln v. MEc-
tClatczie, 36 Conn. 136; s. c. 10 Am. L. Reg. 634.
Where an agent advertised a farm for sale at his own expense,
under a contract with the owner to furnish a purchaser, and a farmer
seeing it, directed the purchaser to the owner, the agent was held
entitled to his commission: Anderson v. Cox, 16 Neb. 10; Barp
v. Cummins, 54 Penn. St. 894; contra, Ukarlton v. Wood, 11
Heisk. 19. But merely putting a purchaser on the track of pro-
perty is not equivalent to presenting him to the seller, so as to
entitle the broker to a commission: Sievers v. Grffin, 14 Ill. (App.)
63. If the broker introduced the purchaser to the d~fendant for a
different purpose, which was accomplished, and the acquaintance
thus brought about between the parties led ultimately, without
further intervention of the broker, to the sale of tie -property in
question, the broker is not entitled to his commission: HoOlave
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v. Paine, 2 Sweeny 407; s. c. 41 How. Pr. 140; Desmond v.
jStebbins, 5 N. E. Rep. 151.
A person desiring a loan made application in writing upon which
was an endorsement authorizing a single broker to procure the loan,
and the broker left copies of such application with a number of
persons, one of whom, induced by the application, without the
broker's knowledge, lent the money. It was held that the broker
was the procuring cause of the loan, and entitled to his commission:
Derrickson v. Quimby, 43 N. J. L. 373.
A. employed B. to sell a house. B. procured of 0. an offer of
$5000, which B. advised A. to accept. A. afterwards negotiated
a sale of the house to 0. for $5300. It was held that B. was not
entitled to a commission on the sale; for A. was the procuring
cause: White v. Twitchings, 26 Hun 503. So if the services of
the broker do not accomplish the sale, and, after the proposed pur-
chaser has decided not to buy, other persons induce him to buy,
the broker has no right to a commission: .Earp v. Cummins, 54
Penn. St. 894.
Same continued.-A., desiring additional capital in his business,
wrote to B. (accountants in London, with whom he had been in
correspondence on the subject), as follows: "The land and premises
of the Britannia Works in this town are my property solely, but
the business is carried on by myself and my partner. In case of
your introducing a purchaser of all the premises, or part of them,
of whom I shall approve, or in case of your introducing capital
which I should accept, I could pay you a commission of five per
cent. on the amount in either case, provided no one else is entitled
to a commission in respect of the same introduction." B. succeeded
in introducing one W. to A., who advanced him by way of loan
10,0001., upon which B. received the agreed commission. * Some
few months afterwards A. and W. entered into an agreement for a
partnership, on which occasion W. made a further.advance of 40001.
by way of capital to the concern. B. claimed commission upon
this further advance; and, in an action brought to enforce his
claim, he admitted that the advance of the 40001. was not con-
templated at the time of the advance of the 10,0001., but that the
40001. was advanced solely in consequence of the negotiation for
the partnership between A. and W. It was held that B. was not
entitled to a commission on the second advance, because it was
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not procured by him: Tribe v. Taylor, 1 C. P. Div. 505; s. c. 17
Moak 389.
The plaintiffs were instructed by the defendant to offer a lease-
hold house for sale, for which they were to receive a commission
if they found a purchaser, but one guinea only for their trouble
if the premises were sold "without their intervention." The par-
ticulars of the sale were entered on their book by them, and they
gave a few cards to view the premises. A person who had observed
the premises in passing noticed it was for sale, but by whom did
not appear. He went to the house, but could not then look over
it. He went away under an impression that it was too large. On
his way to a railway station he called at the plaintiffs office to
inquire about houses; and there received four cards, one of which
was for the defendant's house, stating the particulars of the pro-
posed sale. In a few days afterwards he went to the house, but
thought the price asked too high, and he went away. This person
had no further communication with the plaintiffs; but he subse-
quently renewed his negotiation with a friend of the defendant's,
and ultimately became the purchaser of the lease at a less price
than first asked him. The trial judge nonsuited the plaintiff.
This was held error, for there was evidence for the jury that the
purchaser had become such "through the plaintiff's intervention,"
and consequently that the plaintiff was entitled to the stipulated
commission. It was also held proper to ask the.purchaser, "would
you, if you had not gone to the plaintiff's office and got the card,
have purchased the house ?" And to receive his answer, "I should
think not:" Mansell v. Clement&, L. R., 9 C. P. 139; s. c. 8
Moak 449.
An auctioneer was employed to sell an estate, under an agree-
ment to receive a certain per cent. as commission if the estate
should be sold ; and in case the estate was not sold he was to
receive a certain sum for his trouble and expense. Having put up
the estate at auction, and it failing to sell, the auctioneer was asked
by a person who had attended the sale, who was the owner of the
property, and he was referred by him to his principal. Ultimately
that person, without any further intervention of the auctioneer,
became the purchaser. Under these facts the auctioneer was
allowed to recover his commission, for through his means the sale
was effected: Green v. .Bartlett, 14 C. B. (N. S.) 681; s. c. 32
L. J. (0. P.) 261.
REAL ESTATE AND BROKERS' COMMISSIONS.
Same continued.-So where the plaintiff's evidence tended to
prove that the defendants purchased certain real estate through his
instrumentality, he acting as a broker for the seller, he claimed
from the defendants a part of his commissions ; and this they
declined to pay, but promised him part of the profits when they sold.
He advised as to the best mode of sale, and procured maps of the
property, putting them up in different places ; and also putting up
signs near the property. He also inserted an advertisement in a
newspaper, referring to himself as broker, which was recognised
and paid for by the defendants. A purchaser, attracted to the pro-
perty by the maps, signs and advertisements, opened negotiations
for a purchase directly with the defendants, who, therefore, notified
the plaintiff of such fact, directed him not to further advertise or
make any other efforts to sell, and promised him his commission if
the sale was effected, which was done. Under these facts the
plaintiff was allowed to recover his commission: Sussdorff v.
Schmidt, 55 N. Y. 319.
A., being the owner of three parcels of land, employed B., a real
estate broker, to negotiate sales of them at a specified price for
each. B. found a purchaser for one, and the sale was effected, upon
which he received his commission. Subsequently A. informed the
purchaser of the first tract of his ownership of, and desire to sell,
one of the other tracts; and a contract was made between them for
a sale and purchase of the latter tract for the price and upon the
terms under which B. had been instructed to sell. B. took no part
in the last sale, and gave no information to the purchaser. It was
held that he was not entitled to a commission on the last sale, on
the ground that he was not "an efficient agent in or the procuring
cause of the contract :" HeClave v. Paine, 49 N. Y. 561.
A broker informed his principal that a certain person would take
the farm (held for sale) at the price named, buy some of the chat-
tels on it, but added that he would "want some things put in trade."
It was held that the terms of the purchase, thus indicated, varying
from those offered by the principal, the latter might thereafter sell
to another without becoming liable to the broker: .Darrow v. Ear-
low, 21 Wis. 302.
Sale after Agency is Terminated.-Commissions can only be
earned and recovered by virtue of a contract existing between the
broker and his principal ; and if no contract exists no commission
will be allowed, however instrumental the broker may have been in
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bringing about the sale or purchase: Pierce v. Thomas, 4 E. D.
Smith 354; Holley v. Townsend, 16 How. Pr. 125; Earp v. Cum-
mins, 54 Penn. St. 394; Atwater v. Lockwood, 39 Conn. 45;
0oleman v. Garrigues, 18 Barb. 60; .Redfield v. Tegg, 38 N. Y.
212. The mere ordinary agency of a wife for her husband is not
sufficient: Harper v. Goodall, 10 Abb. N. Cas. 161; s. c. 62
How. Pr. 288; Wylie v. Marine Nat. Bank, 61 N. Y. 415.
Often claims for commission are made by brokers after the agency
is terminated. This termination may be by an express or an
implied understanding. Thus where a broker was employed to sell
lands on certain terms, and showed them to a person who negotiated
wholly with the owner, and bought on lower terms than the agent
offered, the owner not knowing that the buyer had had any com-
munication with the broker; and the owner when the negotiations
began having notified the broker that his authority was suspended;
it was held that the broker could not recover any commission:
Blodgett v. Sioux City, Jie., Bd., 63 Iowa 606.
The son of the owner of a house, at the request of a broker,
telegraphed his father for the lowest price. No sale followed at
that time because of encumbrances on the real estate. Eight
months after the encumbrances were removed, and the sale was
effected to the same person proposing at first to buy the house.
With the last negotiations the broker had nothing to do; and it was
held that he was not entitled to any compensation: Chandler v.
Sutton, 5 Daly 112. The defendant employed a broker to sell a
country seat, and the latter introduced R., who proposed to exchange
a mine for it. There was no sale at that time. A year and a half
after R. bought the place as agent for his wife. The broker was
allowed no comuiission : Harris v. Burtnett, 2 Daly 189.
So where an agent was employed by a bank to find a purchaser
for a certain tract at $80,000, and found one who was willing to pay
only $75,000, which the bank refused; but on the same day, after
the broker had abandoned the right to furnish a purchaser, the per-
sons who had made the offer of $75,000 raised it to $80,000, which
was unknown to the broker, and it was accepted, it was held that
the broker was not entitled to any commission : Wylie v. 2Marine
Nat. Bank, 61 N. Y. 415. See Chandler v. Sutton, 5 Daly 112;
Bennett v. Kidder, 5 Id. 512; -Dennis v. Charlick, 6 Hun 21 ;
Schwartze v. Yearly, 31 Md. 270 ; Vreeland v. Vetterlein, 33 N. J.
L. 247.
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Discharge of Agent by the .Principal.-Where the authority of
an agent employed to sell on commission is revoked by his principal
before a sale has been effected, the right of the agent to remuneration
for what he has done in endeavoring to effect a sale depends on the
terms on which he was employed: Simpson v. Lamb, 17 0. B.
603; s. c. 2 Jur. N. S. 91; 25 L. J. 0. P. 113. The principal
may usually discharge his agent, if he act in good faith, without
incurring any liability to him for anything he has performed, if done
before the agent has completed the contract between them: Sibbald
v. Bethlehem Iron Co., 83 N. Y. 378. And if the principal per-
mits the agent to proceed in his search for a purchaser until he finds
one without notice to him that he is discharged, or that he (the
owner) has himself effected a sale, the agent will be entitled to his
commission: Bash v. Hill, 62 Ill. 216. The rule is the same even
though the purchaser accepted had been offered before by the agent:
Uphoff v. Ulrich, 2 Ill. App. 399. But after a purchaser is found
the principal cannot then discharge the agent and complete the
purchase himself so as to deprive the agent of his commission:
Goss v. Stevens, 32 M~inn. 472; Richards v. Jackson, 31 Md.
250 ; .Prickett v. Badger, 1 0. B. (N. S.) 296 ; Phelon v. Gardner,
43 Cal. 306; Bell v. Kaiser, 50 Mo. 150; Tyler v. Parr, 52 Id.
249; Briggs v. Boyd, 65 Barb. 199; Stillman v. Mitchell, 2
Robt. 523.
"A broker is never entitled to commissions for unsuccessful
efforts. The risk is wholly his. The reward comes only with his
success. That is the plain contract and contemplation of the
parties. The broker may devote his time and labor, and expend
money with ever so much of devotion to the interest of his employer,
and yet if he fails, if without effecting an agreement or accomplish-
ing a bargain, he abandons the effort, or his authority is fairly and
in good faith terminated, he gains no right to compensation. He
loses the labor and effort which was staked upon success. And
in such event it matters not that after his failure, and the termina-
tion of his agency, what he has done proves of use and benefit to
the principal. In a multitude of cases that must necessarily result.
He may have introduced to each other parties who otherwise would
have never met; he may have created impressions which, under
later and more favorable circumstances, naturally lead to and
materially assist in the consummation of a sale; he may have planted
the very seeds from which others reap the harvest; but all that
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gives him no claim. It was part of his risk that failing himself,
not successful in fulfilling his obligation, others might be left to
some extent to avail themselves of the fruit of his labor :" Sibbald
v. Bethlehem Iron Co., 83 N. Y. 378.
"If in the midst of negotiations instituted by the broker, and
which were plainly and evidently approaching success, the seller
should revoke the authority of the broker, with the view of con-
cluding the bargain without his aid, and avoiding the payment of
commissions about to be earned, it might well be said that the due
performance of his obligation by the broker was purposely prevented
by the principal. But if the latter acts in good faith, not seeking
to escape the payment of commissions, but moved fairly by a view
of his own interest, he has the absolute right before a bargain is
made while negotiations remain unsuccessful, before commissions are
earned, to revoke the broker's authority, and the latter cannot there-
after claim compensation for a sale made by the principal, even
though it be to a customer with whom the broker unsuccessfully
negotiated, and even though, to some extent, the seller might be
justly said to have availed himself of the fruits of the broker's
labor :" Id. ; Satterthwaite v. Vreeland, 3 Hun 152.
Principal .Effecting a Sale.-The principal may sell his own
property after he has placed it in the hands of the broker to a pur-
chaser not procured by the broker, unless he has especially con-
tracted to pay him in the event of a sale procured by himself:
Wylie v. Marine Nat. Bank, 61 N. Y. 415 ; Dolan v. Scanlan,
57 Cal. 261 ; Dubois v. Dubois, 54 Ia. 216; Briggs v. Rowe, 1
Abb. App. Dec. 189; Barnard v. Monnot, 1 Id. 108; Keys v.
Johnson, 68 Penn. St. 42; .McClave v. Paine, 49 N. Y. 561;
Darrow v. Harlow, 21 Wis. 302.
If the broker procure a purchaser, and the owner sells to him,
not knowing that the broker had procured him, he is liable for the
commission, even though the buyer purchased on the strength of
more information than the broker gave: HManford v. Shapter,
4 Daly 243; Bornstein v. Lans, 104 Mass. 214. And if the con-
tract is that the broker shall have a certain time within which to
effect the sale, and during such period the owner sell it to a person
with whom the agent has had no communication, yet the owner is
liable for the commission, because he has deprived the broker of
his power to earn it, and he need not produce a purchaser within
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the specified time, for the owner has put it beyond his power to
complete the contract: Lane v. Albright, 49 Ind. 275; Vinton v.
Baldwin, 95 Id. 433. Yet where the broker was employed to sell
the principal's farm, upon an agreement to pay therefor whatever
sum could be realized above a certain sum, and forty days there-
after the principal, who had not reserved any right to find his own
buyer, sold the farm for a larger sum than the one named, without
the agent's consent, and it was alleged that the agent could within
a reasonable time have procured a sale, a complaint based on such
facts was held to be bad, and not to entitle the broker to a recovery :
Stewart v. Nurray, 92 Ind. 543. M. employed a broker to pur-
chase two lots; L. conducted the negotiations until the owner
finally agreed to accept $32,000 net for them. The owner told L.
that he would not pay any commission on a sale at that price. L.
communicated these facts to his customer, who said that the com-
mission was a small matter, and that he would see to or take care of
it. The matter remained in this condition one month, when M.
went personally to the owner and completed the purchase at the
net price given by the owner to L. It was held that the purchaser
was liable for the brokerage: Lyneh v. McEKenna, 58 How. Pr. 42.
Sale Broken Off by Principal.-If the broker procure a purchaser
who agrees to the terms of the purchase, the principal cannot cap-
tiously refuse to complete the sale or purchase: Delaplaine v, Turn-
ley, 44 Wis. 31; Fraser v. Wyckoff, 63 N. Y. 445; Herman v.
Martineau, 1 Wis. 151; Hart v. Hoffman, 44 How. Pr. 168;
Hague v. O' Conner, 41 Id. 287; s. c. 1 Sweeny 472; Clentworth
v. Luther, 21 Barb. 145. A broker who has procured a purchaser
is entitled to the agreed commissions, notwithstanding the failure
of the purchaser to perform or the vendor's failure to fully under-
stand the contract, if not caused by the fraud or deception of the
broker: Bach v. Emerich, 35 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 548; or where the
purchaser refuses to sign the contract of purchase because of the
insertion, against the broker's objection, of the usual forfeiture
clause: Beebe v. Banger, 35 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 452.
Where a broker was employed to sell a house, and it was agreed
that if a sale was effected through the agency of the broker, or any
other person, he was to receive a certain commission; and the
broker advertised the property and made efforts to sell to different
persons, among others to a church society; and a parol contract
was effected between the principal and the society, and the former
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told the broker he had sold the house to the church; and upon the
presentation of a written contract the principal refused to sign it,
claiming to have withdrawn it from the market, and no contract was
ever signed or purchase-money paid, but the sale was thereafter
consummated and the property conveyed to the church; it was held
that the broker was entitled to his commission upon the production
of the purchaser, ready and willing to purchase upon the principal's
terms, although the principal was unable or refused to consummate
the contract; that the parol contract showed prima facie that a
proper purchaser had been produced; and the principal, having based
his refusal to pay, not upon the ground of the invalidity of the parol
contract, but upon that of the withdrawal of the property, could
not shield himself from liability upon the former ground: Mooney
v. .Elder, 56 N. Y. 238.
Broker must Comply with his Contract.-The broker must comply
with the terms of his contract with his principal, however onerous
it may be, before he is entitled to his commission; or else compli-
ance with it must be excused by some act of the principal. "Where
the vendor is satisfied with the terms, made by himself, through the
broker, to the purchaser, and no valid objections can be stated, in
any form, to the contract, it would seem to be clear that the com-
mission of the agent was due, and ought to be paid. It would be
a novel principle if the vendor might capriciously defeat his own
contract with his agent by refusing to pay him when he had done
all that he was bound to do. The agent might well undertake to
procure the purchaser; but this being done, his labor and expense
could not avail him, as he could not coerce a -willingness to pay the
commissions which the vendor had agreed to pay. Such a state
of things could only arise from an express understanding that the
vendor was to pay nothing, unless he should choose to make the
sale :" Kock v. Emmerling, 22 How. 69. See Sibbald v. Bethde-
hem 1ron Go., 88 N. Y. 378 ; Love v. Miller, 53 Ind. 294.
The broker may enter into a contract which limits his right to a
commission to the actual receipt of the purchase-money. Thus
where the commission was to be three per cent. of the purchase-
money the broker was held not entitled to a commission, although
the vendor refused to sell on the terms he first designated: Power
v. Kane, 5 Wis. 265.
A surveyor was retained by the defendant to negotiate with the
commissioners of certain woods and forests for the sale to them of
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certain premises of the defendant, for which he was to receive a
commission of two per cent. "on the sum which might be obtained
either by private treaty, arbitration, or trial by jury." The parties
failing to agree, a jury was empannelled, by whom the value was
assessed at 40001.; but an annuity charge rested upon the land,
and the commissioners refused to take it until this charge was paid
off, and for that purpose placed the amount assessed in the hands
of the accountant-general, to await the adjustment of the difference.
The surveyor was aware of this annuity charge at the time he
entered into the employment. It was held that he was not entitled
to any commissions until the money awarded was actually received
by the defendant: Bull v. -rice, 5 M. & P. 2; s. a. 7 Bing. 237.
A. negotiated for an exchange of certain advowsons between B.
and C., and B. contracted to pay A. 1001. for commission, "one-
third-down, and the remaining two-thirds when the abstract of con-
veyance is drawn out." B.'s abstract was delivered to C., but
nothing further was done in the matter, because 0. declined to pro-
ceed with the exchange. A. sued for the recovery of the balance
of the commission, and it was held that he could not recover; for
the event had not happened for which the commission was to be
paid: Alder v. Boyle, 4 0. B. 635; S. 0. 11 Jur. 591; 16 L. J.
0. P. 232; see Simpson v. Lamb, 17 0. B. 603; S. C. 2 Jur.
(N. S.) 91; 25 L. J. 0. P. 113.
A. was employed to sell an advowson for B. upon the terms con-
tained in a circular, in which it was stated that the commission
should become payable upon the adjustment of terms between the
contracting parties in every instance in which any information had
been given by, or any communication whatsoever had been made
from, A.'s office, however and bywhomsoever the negotiations might
have been conducted, and notwithstanding the business might have
been subsequently taken off the books, or the negotiation might
have been concluded in consequence of communications previously
made from other agencies, or on information otherwise derived, or
the principals might have made themselves liable to pay a commis-
sion to other agents; and that 'no accommodation that might be
afforded as to time of payment or advance should retard the pay-
ment of commission. A contract of sale having been arranged
through A.'s agency, and duly executed, and a deposit paid on
October 14th, the residue of the purchase-money being payable on
December 31st, it was held that A. was entitled to his commission
558 REAL ESTATE AND BROKERS' COMMISSIONS.
at all events on December 31st, although the full purchase-money
had not, for some unexplained reason, then been paid: 'Lara v.
Hill, 15 C. B. N. S. 45.
A broker was to receive five per cent. upon the purchase-money
when the contract was completed. The owner sold the tract him-
self and revoked the agent's authority. It was held that he was not
liable for commission: Simpson v. Lamb, 17 0. B. 603; s. c. 2
Jur. N. S. 91 ; 25 L. J. C. P. 118. But if the commission is pay-
able out of the purchase-money, and the owner arbitrarily refuses
to accept, and for that reason the purchase is not completed, the
principal is liable: Cavender v. Waddingham, 2 Mo. App. 551.
And a refusal to sign the agreement to sell is equivalent to a refusal
to sell: .Neilson v. Lee, 60 Cal. 555.
Where the contract was to effect a sale, but there was inserted in
the written contract for the sale a stipulation that if either party
should fail to execute it he should forfeit $1000 ; and the purchaser
refused to take the property, paying the forfeiture, it was held that
the broker could not recover of the owner, for there was no sale:
Kimberly v. Henderson, 29 Md. 512. See MeGavocek v. Woodlief,
20 How. 221.
Same continued.-If the contract is to employ a purchaser on
specified terms, the broker cannot recover his commissions if he
does not perform that service, unless the employer interfere and
prevent a performance ; and a discharge of the broker before a cus-
tomer is secured will not'be such an interference, unless he had a
certain time within which to procure a customer, and within that
time secured one. Under such circumstances, a revocation of his
authority within the specified time is a breach of his contract, for
which he may have an action: Toppin v. Healey, 11 W. R. 466.
Performance on his part is a necessary condition precedent to a
recovery: Briggs v. Rowe, 1 Abb. App. Dec. 189; Barnard v.
Aonnot, 1 Id. 108; Keys v. Johnson, 68 Penn. St. 42. If the
condition is that a purchaser must be produced who consummates the
sale, then a sale is a necessary contingency to a recovery : .Richards
v. Jackson, 81 Md. 250 ; R7yams v. Miller, 71 Ga. 608.
The contract to purchase need not be in writing, unless it is so
stipulated, if the purchaser is willing to consummate it: Teinrich v.
Korn, 4 Daly 75; Fischer v. Bell, 91 Ind. 243; Barnard v. Mon-
not, 6 Am. L. R. N. S. 209. But if it is to be in writing, then it must
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be such as can be enforced in a court of equity: Simonson v.
.Kissidk, 4 Daly 183.
If the contract is "to bring the purchaser and vendor together,"
this "includes the idea of their being bound to each other in a valid
contract:" Tombs v. Alexander, 101 Mass. 255; Cook v. .Fiske,
12 Gray 491.
An owner wrote to a broker his terms of sale, and told him if he
could effect a sale the writer would be glad ; that the right to refuse
offers was reserved, but that the broker might rely on it that if he found
customers at the price named, they could have the land and he his
commission. The broker found customers for the lands, and it was
held that this alone entitled him to compensation: Hopwood v.
Corbin, 63 Iowa 218.
An owner employed a broker to sell certain real estate for a fixed
compensation, advising him of the title; the broker found a cus-
tomer and brought him to the owner, but no sale was effected on
account of the defective condition of the title. Afterwards the
owner sold the real estate at auction to another person, not found
by the broker, at a higher price than the customers had offered,
although the latter bid the sum he had offered. It was held that
the broker was not entitled to any commission: Tombs v. Alexander,
101 Mass. 255.
The contract between the broker and his principal was as follows:
"If you send, or cause to be sent, by advertisement or otherwise,
any party with whom I may see fit and proper to effect a sale or
exchange of my real estate above described, I will pay you the sum
of $200." The broker found a person who proposed to purchase,
but the sale was not effected. He was refused a recovery for his
compensation: Walker v. Tirrell, 101 Mass. 257; see Pratt v.
Patterson, 7 Phila. 135 ; Brennan v. Perry, 7 Id. 242.
Where the contract was a commission of 2 per cent. on a certain
price fixed, and 30 per cent. on any amount obtained beyond that,
it was held that the broker was not entitled to a per cent. on portion
of the crops growing upon the land sold, which portion was known
by him to belong to another than the owner of the land: Barrett v.
Johnson, 64 Penn. St. 223.
An owner employed a broker to find a purchaser for some land,
at a certain commission on the purchase-money if a sale were
effected. The broker found a purchaser, but the owner refused to
complete the sale. It was held that the broker could recover
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on a quantum meruit for the work and labor done, for he had
performed his part of the contract, and the owner had prevented its
completion: Prlekett v. Badger, 1 0. B. N. S. 296; s. c. 3 Jus. N.
S. 66 ; 26 L. J. C. P. 33. See Mooney v. -Elder, 56 N. Y. 238 ;
Sibbald v. Bethlehem Iron Co., 83 Id. 378 ; nchbald v. Western
Neilgherry Coffee, Tea and Cinchona Co., 34 L. J. C. P. 15; s.
c. 17 0. B. N. S. 733.
If the property is put up at auction and bought in by the owner,
the agent is not entitled to commissions, if it were the understand-
ing, at least, that the owner intended to bid: Hestaer v. Atkins, 1
Marsh. 76; s. c. 5 Taunt. 381.
Prineipal Varying Terms of Contraet.-Usually the contract
between the broker and owner is that a purchaser must be produced
who will enter into a certain specified contract; and upon the per-
fecting of such specified contract, the right to a commission arises:
Schwartze v. Yearly, 31 Md. 270; -Drury v. Newman, 99 Mass.
256 ; Hamlin v. S'hulte, 31 Minn. 486 ; Livezy v. Miller, 61 Md.
336; Casady v. Seely, 29 N. W. Rep. 432. And if a sale is
effected by the owner with the person whose attention is drawn to
property by the broker at a lower figure than the broker was autho-
rized to sell at, there is no liability for commission, unless the owner
has acted in bad faith, havingused the broker to ascertain apurchaser:
Williams v. McGraw, 52 Mich. 480. The principal, however, may so
adopt the. agent's act in finding a purchaser, by slightly modifying
the terms as to entitle him to compensation: Lawrence v. Atwood,
1 ll. (App.) 217; Coleman v. Meade, 13 Bush 358. Thus the
broker agreed to sell a farm at a certain price, found a purchaser
and brought him to the farm, when the purchaser objected to take'
so many acres, and the owner then consented to sell a less quantity.
They all went to the broker's office and he wrote the deeds. It
was held that he was entitled to compensation : Woods v. Stephens,
46 Mo. 555. Where the agent procured a loan on different terms,
it was held that the principal was not liable unless he ratified the
act: Mason v. Clifton, 3 F. & F. 899. Where the broker attempted
to procure a loan on certain named terms, but before he did so, the
principal changed the terms, and the broker was unable to procure
a loan in accordance with the latter terms, but succeeded in getting
one on the first, it was held that he was not entitled to a commis-
sion: Toppin v. Healey, 11 W. R. 466. See Nesbit v. i'elser, 49
Mo. 383, Walton v. New Orleans, 23 La. Ann. 398.
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A house agent can only obtain commission on rent obtained as a
proximate consequence of his act; and an option to take a house is
not exercised if tenancy is continued upon an agreement for a dif-
ferent rent, obtained through the intervention of another house
agent. A trade custom to pay commission under such circumstances
is irrational and void: Curtis v. Nixon, 24 L. T. N. S. 706. See
generally, Stewart v. Mather, 32 Wis. 344; Tower v. O'Neil, 66
Penn. St. 882.
A principal promised to pay a certain per cent. commisssion if
the broker would produce a purchaser of his land at 80001. The
broker introduced the principal to a person who took a lease for
1000 years, at 1501. a year, with the option of purchasing for 30001.
within twenty years ; it was held that the broker had practically
found a purchaser and was entitled to his commission: Rimmer v.
Knowles, 22 W. R. 574; s. c. 30 L. T. N. S. 496. See Hunger-
ford v. Hicks, 39 Conn. 259.
If the agent sell at a greater pr;ce than his principal authorized
him, he cannot recover for the ex. )ss over the price named, even
though his commission is to be a certain per cent. of the selling
price. In such an instance it is his duty to communicate the offer
so received to his principal, and not to purposely conceal it from
him, and if he effect a better trade than authorized to do, his prin-
cipal is entitled to the benefit. If the agent retains a commission
on the surplus, the principal may recover it from him: Blanchard
v. Jones, 101 Ind. 542; Love v. Hoss, 62 Id. 255.
A contract to sell for cash, means a payment on delivery of the
deed: Goss v. Broon, 81 Minn. 484.
But it is a general rule that the principal's stipulation with his
broker as to the price, is not waived by the former selling to the
latter's customer at a less price, unless he does so with knowledge
that the customer is able and willing to pay the price stipulated in
the contract between him and the broker: McArthur v, Slauson,
53 Wis. 41, distinguishing Stewart v. JMhather, 32 Id. 344.
Time within which to Complete a Sale.-The principal cannot
refuse to allow the purchaser a reasonable time to examine the title
on the ground that the time allowed the broker within which to
effect the sale is about to expire: Watson v. Brooks, 8 Sawyer 316 ;
Potvia v. Ourran, 13 Neb. 302. See contra, Watson v. Brooks, 11
Ore. 271.
A contract to sell "within a short time," is fulfilled by furnish-
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ing a purchaser within two weeks, although during that time the
price enhances, of which the owner fails to notify him and of a
change made in the terms: Smith v. Fairchild, 7 Col. 510. Where
the sale was to be made "within a reasonable time," twenty-two
days was held to fill the requirement: Lane v. Albright, 49 Ind.
275. "Where no time for the continuance of the contract is fixed
by the terms, either party is at liberty to terminate it at will, sub-
ject only to the ordinary requirements of good faith :" Sibbald v.
Bethlehem Iron Co., 83 N. Y. 378.
Broker acting as Agent of both Vendor and endee.-"A real
estate or loan broker may recover commissions, although he acts
for both parties ; but it must appear that he acted openly and
fairly, and that all the facts were known to both principals. A
broker is regarded as a middleman, and not as an agent in whom
peculiar trust and confidence are placed :" Vinton v. Baldwin, 88
Ind. 104; Alexander v. The Northwestern Christian University,
57 Id. 466 ; Rupp v. Sampson, 16 Gray 398; Siegel v. Gould, 7
Lansing 177 ; .Pugsley v. Murray, 4 E. D. Smith 245. This is
especially true where he acts as a middleman to bring them to-
gether, and they make their own bargain. In such an instance
there is no reason why he should disclose his double agency; for
he in no way influenced the terms of the contract: Orton v. Sco-
field, 61 Wis. 382; Rice v. Wood, 113 Mass. 133; Balheimer v.
Reichardt, 55 flow. Pr. 414; Rowe v. Stevens, 53 N. Y. 621;
s. c. 35 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 189 ; Herman v. Martineau, I Wis. 151;
Redfield v. Tegg, 38 N. Y. 212.
These cases sometimes arise in exchanges of properties, where
the double agency is known. In such instances the owners must
both pay, if they both employed him : Collins v. Fowler, 8 Mo.
App. 588; Mullen v. Keetzleb, 7 Bush 253; Gordon v. Clapp,
113 Mass. 335; Rice v. Wood, Id. 133; Dury e v. Lester, 75
N. Y. 442 ; Bell v. Me0onnell, 37 Ohio St. 396.
A usage among brokers to charge commission to both parties is
inadmissible, where the double agency was not disclosed: Farns-
worth v. Hemmer, 1 Allen 494; Walker v. Osgood, 98 Mass.
348.
If a broker is employed by A. to sell his house, effects a trans-
action by which the house is bought by B., who sells the house to
C., the purchase and price paid by B. being dependent upon the
purchase and the price paid by C., by whom the purchase-money,
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the amount of which is the sam6 in each, is paid directly to A.,
who pays the broker a commission for his services in selling A.'s
house, the broker cannot maintain an action to recover compensa-
tion of C., as if he were employed by C. to buy a house for him:
Follansbee v. O'Beilly, 135 Mass. 80.
There are authorities, however, that deny the right to double
compensation under any circumstances: Lynch v. Fallon, 11 R. I.
311; s. c. 16 Am. L. R. 331; .Everhart v. Searle, 71 Penn. St.
256; Lloyd v. Colston, 5 Bush 587; Raisin v. Clark, 41 Md.
158 ; Simonds v. Hoover, 35 Ind. 412. Even in case of an exchange :
Bates v. Copeland, 4 McArthur 50. The question of double
agency must be raised by a plea: Duryee v. Lester, 75 N. Y. 442.
Where an agent was employed by two separate owners of real
estate to make sale of their separate tracts, and he introduced them
to each other, whereby they effected an exchange, it was held that
he was entitled to compensation from both of them: Redfield v.
Tegg, 38 N. Y. 212. See Green v. Robertson, 64 Cal. 75 ; .Dur-
yee v. Lester, 75 N. Y. 442; S. c. 11 J. & S. 564. Yet where the
plaintiff was employed by the defendant as a broker to sell or nego-
tiate a sale of certain real estate, and the plaintiff, at the bame time,
was a broker of M., and, subsequently, the defendant proposed to
plaintiff an exchange of his premises for those of M., and an ex-
change was effected, the plaintiff acting in the negotiation for M.,
it was held that the plaintiff could not recover of the defendant for
commissions; for his right to compensation, if any, was under the
original employment which had never been consummated; and that
his undertaking to act for M. was a renunciation of the agency for
the defendant, and nothing short of an unequivocal recognition
thereafter by the parties of its existence would establish it: Carman
v. Beach, 63 N. Y. 97.
Several Brokers Employed at the Same Time.-If two brokers are
separately employed to sell the same property, and each separately
call the attention of the purchaser to the property, the one first
effecting the sale thereafterwards is entitled to the commission, and
the other is not entitled to anything: 2Jfaracella v. Odell, 3 Daly
123; -Dryer v. Bauch, 42 How. Pr. 22; s. c. 3 Daly 434; 10
Abb. N. S. 343 ; Ward v. Fletcher, 124 Mass. 224. If the first
broker's action causes the sale he is entitled to his commission, al-
though another broker in fact negotiated the sale and obtained a
commission: Winans v. Jaques, 10 Daly 487; but if the sale is
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broken off because of a disagreement as to price, and through
anotherbroker a sale is effected to the same party on different terms,
the first broker is not entitled to compensation: Livezy v. Miller,
61 Md. 336. Where he employs several brokers the entire duty
of the owner is performed by remaining neutral between them; and
he has a right to make the sale to a buyer produced by one of them,
without being called upon to decide between them as to which of
them was the primary cause of the purchase: Vreeland v. -Fetter-
lein, 33 N. J. L. 247. Elsewhere it is said he must pay the one
effecting the sale, and cannot exercise his option: -Eggleston v.
Austin, 27 Kan. 245.
If one broker effects a sale the owner should at once notify the
others ; else he may be compelled to pay more than one commission,
if another, in the meantime, without knowledge of the sale, effect
a sale: Fox v. Rouse, 47 Mich. 558.
Notice to one broker of a change of purpose does not affect
another, nor is the latter chargeable with notice because of acts of
the owner in improving the property inconsistent with a design to
sell: Lloyd v. Matthews, 51 N. Y. 124.
iffect of Misconduct of Agent.-The agent must act in the ut-
most good faith, especially where he is entitled to a commission on
the production of a person ready and willing to purchase: Pratt v.
Patterson, 3 At. Rep. (Pa.) 858. Any concealment on his part in
any way bearing on the transaction will defeat his claim for com-
pensation : Bell v. MeConnell, 37 Ohio St. 396 ; even though he
have no fraudulent intent: Pratt v. Patterson, 12 Phila. 460; Ben-
nett v. Kidder, 5 Daly 512; Hamond v. Holiday, 1 C. & P. 384;
White v. Chapman, 1 Stark. 113; Hurst v. Holding, 3 Taunt.'32.
Thus where a sale failed by reason of a tax lien, of which the
broker inadvertently failed to inform his principal, it was held that
he was not entitled to a commission, and it was no excuse for him
to say that the sale would have been consummated if it had not
been for his inability to show a clear title: Rockwell v. Newton,
44 Conn. 333. See De Santos v. Taney, 13 La. Ann. 151.
A broker may enter into a contract for the exclusion of all other
brokers ; in which event the owner cannot sell through another
agency, and escape a liability to the first broker on his producing a
purchaser: Moses v. Bierling, 31 N. Y. 462.
If the broker is negligent, to the damage of his principal, he can-
not recover his commissions. Such was held to be the case when
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A. and B. agreed to exchange properties within a certain period by
warranty deed, and free from encumbrances, one tract for another;
and the broker, as agent of A., preferred a warranty deed for A.'s
tract, conveying it to B. subject to certain taxes, and had it exe-
cuted by A., but on account of the clause relating to the taxes, it
was refused by B., of which refusal A. was kept in ignorance until
the expiration of the time stipulated : Fisher v. Dynes, 62 Ind.
848.
Broker as Purchaser.-Where an agent was employed to sell
land and sold it to a company of which he was a shareholder and
director, it was held that he was not entitled to commissions from
his employer, for such conduct could not be said to have been good
faith: Salomons v. Pender, 3 H. & 0. 639; s. c. 11 Jur. N. S.
432; 34 L. J. Exch. 95; 13 W. R. 637; 12 L. T. N. S. 267.
The agent cannot find a purchaser in himself unless the owner
consents to his purchase: Tower v. O'Neil, 66 Penn. St. 332.
And if he purchase the real estate through a third person he is not
entitled to a commission: Bach v. rmerich, 35 N. Y. Sup. Ct.
548; Hughes v. Washington, 72 Ill. 84.
If he offer himself as a purchaser, and with the knowledge of
the principal becomes the purchaser, either alone or with another;
or he is to be paid a commission upon producing a purchaser ready
and willing to buy at such a price as may be agreed upon between
the parties when brought together, and then himself with the know-
ledge of the vendor, becomes the purchaser, either alone or
jointly with another,-in either case he is not entitled to the com-
mission, unless it was the understanding between him and the
vendor at the time of the sale that he should be entitled to it.
Stewart v. Mather, 32 Wis. 344. In such an instance there must
be clear proof that the understanding of the vendor at the time of
the sale was that the broker should have a commission. Grant v.
Eardy, 33 Wis. 668.
If the clerk of the broker, who has access to his principal's cor-
respondence with his principal, buys the real estate, he will be held
as a trustee for his principal: Gardner v. Ogden, 22 N. Y. 327.
Negotiating the Sale.-If the broker's contract is to produce a
purchaser, it is no part of his duty to negotiate the sale. That the
owner must do if he desires to reap the benefit of his contract with
the broker: Arnold v. Wood, 13 N.Y. Week. Dig. 302 ; Boyster
v.Jageveney, 9 Lea 148 ; Herman v. Martineau, 1 Wis. 151; Lloyd
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v. Matthews, 51 N. Y. 124 ; Sibbald v. Bethlehem Iron Co., 83 Id.
378. If the contract is to complete the purchase, then when the
title papers are delivered, his contract is performed, and authority
at an end: Walker v. Derby, 5 Biss. 134.
Fraud upon Vendee.-The vendor, to defeat his agent's claim
for commissions, cannot insist that either he or the agent committed
a fraud upon the vendee, so long as the vendee does not seek to avoid
the contract: Grant v. Hardy, 33 Wis. 668. Such was held to
be the case where the agent fraudulently concealed from the vendee
the fact that he was acting as an agent, and advised him as a friend
that the property was well worth the price asked, and could not be
obtained for less, while in fact, the owner was willing to take much
less, and the agent was to receive all over what he was willing to
take: Hardy v. Stoiebraker, 31 Wis. 640.
Usage.-A usage prevalent among brokers cannot give one a
commission when the sale is made by another: Pratt v. Bank, 12
Phila. 378. Where several brokers were employed to procure a
loan, and one of them did, whereupon the borrower refused to take
a second loan, a usage to not pay the second broker in such a case
was successfully pleaded to defeat an action by the latter : Glenn v.
Davidson, 37 Md. 365. See Loud v. Hall, 106 Mass. 404.
Lien.-If employed to secure a loan, the broker has a lien on
the money secured for his commissions: Vinton v. Baldwin, 95
Ind. 433.
Statutory Regulation.-If the broker is required by statute to
have a license issued by the state, he cannot recover his commis-
sions, unless he be licensed: Johnson v. Hulings, 103 Penn. St.
498 ; MeConnell v. Kitchens, 20 S. C. 430. But this rule is held
not to apply to an internal revenue license: Pope v. Beals, 108
Mass. 561. If the amount of the fees payable to a broker be fixed by
statute, it cannot be enlarged by contract: Perrine v. Hotchkliss,
58 Barb. 77 ; and if the contract is required by statute to be in
writing, there cannot, in absence of a writing, be any recovery upon
an implied contract to pay for services rendered: McCarthy v.
Loupe, 62 Cal. 299.
Amount of Commission.-In the absence of a contract as to the
amount to be paid, the broker is entitled to recover the value of his
services: Potts v. Aechternaoht, 93 Penn. St. 138. The plaintiff
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effected a sale of certain real estate for M. for $22,000, under a
previous agreement with M. to pay the plaintiff ten per cent. of the
amount of which the property should be sold. M. received in part
payment another piece of real estate at $7525, which was worth at
the time but $4220. It was held that the plainfiff was entitled to
ten per cent. of the real price for which the property was sold, and
not of a fictitious price, or a price that in the trade was regarded
by the parties as fictitious. But in determining whether the price
named in the contract was real or fictitious, it must be considered
how the parties regarded the property received in part payment in
reference to its value. If the parties to the contract fixed upon
the sum of $7525, as the price they judged it worth, that sum must
be the guide, although, in fact, it was of less value ; or if the plain-
tiff and M. judged it worth that price, the result is the same; Wake-
field v. Estate of Hierrick, 88 Vt. 82. See Biggs v. Gordon, 8
C. B. N. S. 638.
Miscellaneous.-If separate owners of distinct parts of an entire
tract jointly employ a broker to sell the whole tract, an action may
be maintained by him against all jointly, on such contract; but if
it be not proven he will fail in his suit: McGill v. -Pressley, 62
Ind. 193. Where it was alleged that the broker was to have five per
cent. of the amount of the sale, and proof showed five per cent, of
the amount was $5000, there was held to be an immaterial variance:
.lMenifee v. Higgins, 57 Ill. 50. If the broker retain an excess
over the amount at which he was allowed to sell, on a fortunate
sale, he is liable to his principal without a demand first made: Love
v. Hoss, 62 Ind. 255.
If an agent of the owner, within the scope of his authority, em-
ploy a broker to negotiate a sale, and the owner revoke the agent's
authority, and the broker goes on and consummates the sale with-
out notice of such revocation, the owner is liable for his commis-
sions: Lamson v. Sims, 48 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 281.
The defendant employed the plaintiff to sell the Old South
Church, in Boston. The plaintiff talked to P, about buying it for
himself. Afterwards, the Old South Church Society was formed
to preserve the property, and to raise money P. took a deed of the
church property for a mortgage to secure the payment of money
loaned. It was held that he was not a purchaser: Viaux v. Old
,'outh Society, 133 Mass. 1.
